IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JONATHAN S. EAGLE,

Plaintiff,

٧.

Civil Action No. 8:13-CV-636 (DEP)

CAROLYN COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

FOR PLAINTIFF

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

SCHNEIDER LAW FIRM 57 Court Street

Plattsburgh, New York 12901

MARK SCHNEIDER, ESQ.

FOR DEFENDANT

HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York P.O. Box 7198 100 S. Clinton Street Syracuse, NY 13261-7198

MONIKA K. CRAWFORD, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff

seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. Oral argument was conducted in connection with those motions on July 10, 2014, during a telephone conference held on the record. At the close of argument I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination did not result from the application of proper legal principles and is not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, a transcript of which is attached and incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18 (formerly, General Order No. 43) which was issued by the Hon. Ralph W. Smith, Jr., Chief United States Magistrate Judge, on January 28, 1998, and subsequently amended and reissued by Chief District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., on September 12, 2003. Under that General Order an action such as this is considered procedurally, once issue has been joined, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2) The Commissioner's determination that plaintiff was not

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the

Social Security Act, is VACATED.

3) The matter is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner, with a

directed finding of disability and for the sole purpose of calculating benefits

owing to the plaintiff for the period prior to February 8, 2011, and without a

directed finding of disability and for further proceedings consistent with the

court's determination for the period from February 8, 2011 to November 15,

2011, date of the Commissioner's determination.

4) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon

this determination, remanding the matter to the Commissioner pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and closing this case.

David E. Peebles

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 1

July 17, 2014

Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TONATUAN EACLE

JONATHAN EAGLE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

13-CV-636

CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Decision rendered on July 10, 2014

James Hanley Federal Building, Syracuse, New York,

HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States

Magistrate-Judge, Presiding.

APPEARANCES (by telephone)

For Plaintiff: MARK A. SCHNEIDER

Attorney at Law 57 Court Street

Plattsburgh, New York 12901

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Office of General Counsel

26 Federal Plaza

New York, New York 10278 BY: MONIKA CRAWFORD, ESQ.

Eileen McDonough, RPR, CRR
Official United States Court Reporter
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(315)234-8546

THE COURT: Thank you. I'll have to let that be the last word.

2.5

I have a request under 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) for a judicial review of an adverse determination of the Commissioner.

The plaintiff in this case was born in February of 1993. Turned 18 in February 2011. At the time of the hearing in this matter, he was in eleventh grade in special education classes. He has an Individualized Educational Program, or IEP, that has classified him as learning disabled. The IEP appears at 273 of the Administrative Transcript.

He has been placed in a structured environment with an 8:1:1 ratio, meaning for every eight students there is one teacher and one aide present. That is at 168.

He lives with his paternal grandmother. He's never worked. He has had significant mental health treatment and a variety of diagnoses over time. His treatment has included inpatient treatment at Four Winds Psychiatric Hospital between December of 2006 and January 2007, where he was placed due to threats and suicidal thoughts. That appears at pages 671 and 672 of the Administrative Transcript. He was also placed in a residential setting at Mountain Lake Children's Residence for troubled children between April of 2007 and June of 2009. He was discharged after setting fire to his room in May of 2009.

He has received services at the Behavior Health Services North since 2009. He has been attending approximately one time per week. There are various diagnoses in the record, including attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder, learning disability, conduct disorder, bipolar disorder. He takes Adderall, Abilify and Prozac.

2.5

He has had, as the counsel for the plaintiff indicated, many subpar, extremely subpar GAF assessments. In February of 2010 by a Nurse Practitioner Phillips at 40. That's at page 559 to 561. In June of 2011 Nurse Practitioner Mills assessed him at 40 GAF, at 672 of the record. The Behavioral Center discharge summary in February of 2011 assessed him at a 35. That's at page 650 to 651. Adult intake assessed him at a 48 in April of 2011. That's at page 648.

He has a history of fecal and urinary soiling. Although the urinary soiling may have resolved, the evidence at least suggests that the fecal soiling continues and it is significant. He has engaged in several criminal and quasi-criminal acts and has been jailed for destruction of property. He has also threatened his grandmother with a knife. He was charged with trying to choke a student on a school bus, and with arson. He was consultatively examined in May of 2011 by Dr. Brett Hartman. His report is in the record at 657, 658.

Procedurally, the plaintiff applied for Supplemental

- 1 | Security Income, or SSI, benefits in March of 2010. A
- 2 | hearing was conducted beginning in April of 2011 and
- 3 | continued to October 3, 2011 by Administrative Law Judge
- 4 Robert Wright. The Administrative Law Judge issued a
- 5 decision on November 15, 2011, finding no disability either
- 6 during the period when the childhood standard would apply and
- 7 under the adult five-step test. Social Security
- 8 Administration Appeals Council denied review on May 2, 2013,
- 9 making the Commissioner's decision a final determination of
- 10 the agency.
- 11 Applying the childhood test, as indicated previously,
- 12 | the Administrative Law Judge went through the three-step
- 13 test. In the functional equivalence analysis found a marked
- 14 | limitation in caring for oneself and less than marked in
- 15 acquiring and using information, attending and completing
- 16 tasks, interacting and relating with others, and no
- 17 | limitation in the domains of moving about and manipulating
- 18 objects and health and physical well being. And therefore
- 19 | concluded no disability prior to age 18.
- 20 At 18 and forward the Commissioner applied the five-step
- 21 | test. Determined that based on the record that the plaintiff
- 22 | had the residual functional capacity of performing work at
- 23 | all exertional levels with non-exertional limitations
- 24 | specified at page 29 of the Administrative Transcript,
- 25 | relying heavily upon Dr. Hartman's consultative report and

Nurse Practitioner Mills source statement, and found no disability.

2.5

The scope of review of this Court is extremely deferential. My review is limited to determining whether properly the principles were applied and substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. As counsel correctly pointed out, there must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence scattered throughout the Administrative Record. Rather, the Court must review the record as a whole in order to weigh substantiality.

As I indicated, there are obviously two separate periods involved in two separate tests at play. In the childhood determination, once steps one and two are passed and there is no medical equivalence of any of the listed determinations, then the Commissioner determines whether there is functional equivalence, examining six relevant domains as I just previously recited for functional equivalence.

If there is a finding of an extreme limitation in one domain, then there is functional equivalence and a finding of disability is supported. If there is marked limitations in two or more of the list of domains, there is functional equivalence. Extreme limitation is defined by the regulations as interfering very seriously with the claimant's

ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. Marked limitation exists when an impairment interferes seriously with the claimant's ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities.

2.5

In my view the Commissioner's determination concerning the domain of interacting and relating with others as being less than marked is not supported by substantial evidence.

In my view the substantial evidence supports at least a marked limitation in this area, if not an extreme limitation.

The record reflects and the IEP from the plaintiff's school reflects that he has significant outbursts and they can become physical. That's at page 343 and 321 of the record. Nurse Abar considers the plaintiff to have various serious limitations in at least some of the areas, sub-areas of this domain. That's at page 217.

According to the school records, the plaintiff has a special timeout room that he uses when he needs to decompress. He has a large number of in-school suspensions. He testified to 25. He has all younger friends, which under the regulations is one indicia of a limitation in this area. He has made threats to his grandmother. He has assaulted others. He has engaged in self-injurious behavior, including cutting.

I'm on to the next domain. I believe the record also reflects that he has a marked disability in caring for

himself, as the Commissioner found, and I find that to be supported. He engages in self-injurious behavior. Nurse Abar believes he has a serious problem in this area. That's at page 219. He soils himself regularly, as indicated by Dr. Hedden at pages 562 to 565. Dr. Patnode at 474. Nurse Practitioner Phillips at 608.

I think it could be argued that he also has a marked limitation in the area of acquiring and using information given his significant learning impairment that is even recognized by Dr. Hartman at page 658. He is classified as learning disabled and he has ADHD. He is in a very structured environment; 8:1:1. Nurse Abar supports a finding of significant limitation in this domain at page 215. And the Commissioner really, including Jerry Ross at 193 to 197, really did not take fully into account that plaintiff was operating in a structured environment, which would not be the case in a workplace.

Clearly the plaintiff has anger issues. Nurse

Practitioner Mills on July 27, 2010 points out that he went

to the ER, he punched the door, doesn't want to live. That's

at page 589. Nurse Practitioner Dove also noted anger issues

at page 601. There was the bus choking incident which

occurred in November of 2010 when he tried to choke another

student and the police had to be called. That's at pages 357

to 358.

In my view if he does not have an extreme limitation in interacting and relating to others, it is clearly marked, and when that is added to the ALJ's finding that he has a marked limitation in caring for himself, a finding of disability is warranted prior to turning 18. And I agree with plaintiff's counsel that there is compelling evidence of disability. As the Commissioner notes, if there is such overwhelming and compelling evidence, then remand for further consideration is not warranted. Where persuasive proof of disability in the record and further development of the record would serve no useful purpose, the matter should be remanded with a directed finding of disability for a calculation of benefits.

2.5

That's what I intend to do with regard to the childhood period. I have a different analysis with regard to the adult disability. It's clear to me that the Commissioner should have, but did not, engage in much analysis with regard to whether or not plaintiff meets the listed presumptively disabling conditions set out in the Commissioner's Regulations, including 12.04. I think that that should be explored on remand.

It's clear to me that the RFC determination, on which the vocational expert's opinion giving rise to the finding of no disability hinges, is flawed. It did not take into consideration plaintiff's soiling. It did not take into consideration his significant inability to be around and work

with others and interact with others. And it failed to take into consideration or at least discuss his extremely low GAF scores.

2.2

While I agree with the Commissioner's Council that that alone does not translate and correlate directly to workplace limitations, it's a factor that should be discussed in a Commissioner's decision so that the Court can meaningfully make judicial review, and know that those GAF scores were at least taken into consideration.

So I also find that the credibility analysis is flawed, and that the Commissioner did not adequately discuss why the plaintiff's testimony, which is fully consistent as far as I can see with the records in the evidence, was discounted. But I am unable to say that there is persuasive proof of disability. I think that a more full and robust analysis is needed for the adult period of disability. So with regard to that period I will remand without a directed finding of disability for further consideration by the agency.

I will, therefore, grant judgment on the pleadings to the plaintiff, accordingly. And you'll have a decision within the next day or two incorporating by reference my verbal decision.

Thank you both for excellent presentations. Interesting case.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you, Your Honor.

1	MS. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Thank you.
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7	CERTIFICATION
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9	I, EILEEN MCDONOUGH, RPR, CRR, Federal Official
10	Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States
11	District Court for the Northern District of New York,
12	do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28,
13	United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct
14	transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held
15	in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page
16	format is in conformance with the regulations of the
17	Judicial Conference of the United States.
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20	P. C. L. Osh
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